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This article examines the conditions under which firms in different economies were
able to emerge as significant actors in the global computer industry during different
time periods. To achieve this, the article divides into three periods the history of the
industry in terms of the three major policy regimes that have supported the domi-
nant firms and regions. It argues that these policy regimes can be thought of as state
developmentalisms that take significantly different forms across the history of the
industry. U.S. firms’ dominance over their European counterparts in the 1950s and
1960s was underpinned by a system of “military developmentalism” where military
agencies funded research, provided a market and developed infrastructure, but also
demanded high quality products. The “Asian Tigers”—Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, and South Korea—in the 1970s and 1980s were able to eclipse their Latin
American and Indian rivals due in large part to the significant advantages offered by
a highly effective system of “bureaucratic developmentalism,” where bureaucratic
elites in key state agencies and leading business groups negotiated supports for ex-
port performance. The 1990s saw the emergence of a system of “network
developmentalism” where countries such as Ireland and Israel were able to emerge
as new nodes in the computer industry by careful economic and political negotiation
of relations to the United States, reestablished at the center of the industry, and by
more decentralized forms of provision of state support for high-tech development.
Finally, the conditions under which new regimes can emerge are a consequence of
the unanticipated global consequences of previous regimes. While state
developmentalisms have been shaped by existing global regimes, they have pro-
moted further and different rounds of industry globalization.
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Explaining the Global Information Economy
The emergence of a global informational economy is one of the most significantforces shaping the contemporary socioeconomic landscape. In the 1990s, trade
in information and communications technology goods grew at almost double the
rate of total trade, which itself almost doubled over that period, and technological
standards became increasingly globally integrated (OECD, 2002). These technolo-
gies are the basis of a new “techno-economic paradigm,” or the constellation of
technological innovations and institutional structures that provide the basis for new
global processes of production and capital accumulation (Freeman and Louça, 2002;
Perez, 2001). The computer sits at the center of this sector, an iconic industry for
the information age and a flagship industry for aspiring developing nations. Differ-
ent economies have dominated, challenged, and emerged at different stages of the
history of the computer industry—from the United States in the postwar era, to the
East Asian Tigers in the 1970s and 1980s and on to a network of high regions, re-
centered around the United States in the 1990s.
What explains this shifting landscape of the global computer industry? Corpo-
rate strategies have clearly been crucial in the evolution of national computer in-
dustries and technology leaders have shaped the competitive context for the firms
that emerged after them. There are many excellent analyses of the computer indus-
try that trace the connections between firm strategies, interfirm connections, and
the evolution of technologies (Lecuyer, 2000; Braun and MacDonald, 1978). Glo-
bal barriers to entry and network structures in computers are also profoundly shaped
by the hierarchical organization of global innovation through corporate organiza-
tion and networks. The large global firms that continue to dominate technical stan-
dards and hold the crucial intellectual property rights can often set the terms of
trade and technological development for new entrants (Harrison, 1994). However,
there are limits to the focus on corporate strategies and structures in explaining
national and international patterns of dominance. In explaining national patterns of
dominance through an emphasis on corporate strategies, one needs to identify an
accumulation of factors that created a competitive advantage for a particular country’s
firms at particular times. The question in this article therefore shifts to the condi-
tions under which firms in different economies were able to emerge as significant
actors in the global computer industry, as outlined above.
Analyses that emphasize how these successful firms are embedded within broader
“systems of innovation”—the network of interfirm relationships, public institutions,
occupational communities, and other actors that surround any firm—are useful
here. Firms are centers of competence building and are crucial sites for promoting
collective learning within the economy—but in promoting this collective learning,
firms inevitably become tied in to the broader social worlds, which generate infor-
mation and knowledge that is relevant to them (Amin and Cohendet, 2004). These
include the world of technology (which may be science-based, engineering-based,
or craft-based, among others), the world of employee expertise (which again may
vary as to whether it is based on professional bodies of knowledge, craft traditions,
employee networks, or other forms of knowledge), and the world of organizational
and policy knowledge (including public agencies, legal firms, professional bodies,
employer associations, and so on). These systems of innovation can be both territo-
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rial (Lundvall et al., 2002; Kim and Nelson, 2000) and sectoral (Malerba, 2003). A
vast amount of contemporary research shows that “institutional thickness”—the
density of the range of institutions surrounding firms—is absolutely crucial to im-
proving firms’ economic performance (see e.g., Saxenian, 1994 on Silicon Valley;
Kim and Nelson, 2000 on newly industrializing economies). In many, although not
all, cases state and public institutions are central to the system of innovation. In late
industrializing economies and in newly emerging industries, states are particularly
central to attempts to industrialize (Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Amsden,
2001). Therefore, this article seeks to explain changing patterns of national domi-
nance in terms of the underlying regime of state developmentalism within which
firms in different countries were operating, and traces the emergence of new re-
gimes to the global consequences of each previous regime. In each period, we can
identify potential candidates seeking to establish niches, and in some cases even
dominance, within the global industry. The article makes three major arguments.
First, we can meaningfully portray the history of the global computer industry in
terms of the three major policy regimes that have supported the dominant firms and
regions within the industry. An initial period of U.S. dominance developed out of
World War II and was later challenged from the 1960s by firms from Japan and the
“Asian Tigers”—Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. The United States came to
rapidly dominate global markets in information technology in the 30 years after
World War II—IBM alone accounted for 37 percent of mainframe computer sales
(the dominant product within the industry) in 1975 (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998:
15). Through the 1970s and 1980s, Japan began to catch up with the United States
while the leading Asian Tigers grew to be comparable in their technological strength
to stable Western European economies (Porter et al., 2000). By the 1990s, U.S.
dominance reasserted itself at the center of a global network of high-tech regions in
new emerging economies such as Ireland, Israel, and India. Yet this U.S. dominance
was reestablished in the context of a much more globally integrated industry and
simultaneous dominance of and dependence upon global finance and labor to sus-
tain the new computer industries within the United States itself.
Second, I argue that these policy regimes can be thought of as state
developmentalisms that take significantly different forms across the history of the
industry. This article argues that the successful national computer industries in each
period were those that were embedded within a national industrial policy and sys-
tem of innovation that was underpinned by a version of state developmentalism. We
can expect states to consistently play a role in shaping economic action as the state
can provide a vision, which can move the economy beyond damaging equilibria
sustained by uncertainty and fragmentation, coordinate economic actors to exploit
economic externalities, build the institutions necessary for this purpose, and medi-
ate the conflict created in this process (Chang, 1999; Vartiainen, 1999). How and
how much state actors involve themselves directly in corporate strategic decisions
varies significantly and the literature on developmental states has probably relied
excessively on the East Asian cases in formulating an image of the directive state. It
is more accurate usually to see states’ developmental efforts as taking the role of
“midwife” of new firms and sectors and tending to the “husbandry” of these grow-
ing industries (Evans, 1995). Rather than intervening directly in corporate strate-
gies (although they occasionally do), most effective forms of state developmentalism
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provide a range of supportive institutions that bolster systems of innovation and
promote the reorganization of existing institutions and interests.
In the computer industry, U.S. firms’ dominance over their European counter-
parts in the 1950s and 1960s was underpinned by a system of “military
developmentalism,” where military agencies funded research, provided a market,
developed infrastructure, but also demanded high quality products. The Asian Ti-
gers in the 1970s and 1980s were able to eclipse their Latin American and Indian
rivals due in large part to the significant advantages offered by a highly effective
system of “bureaucratic developmentalism,” where bureaucratic elites in key state
agencies and leading business groups negotiated supports for export performance.
The 1990s saw the emergence of a system of “network developmentalism” where
countries such as Ireland and Israel were able to emerge as new nodes in the com-
puter industry by careful economic and political negotiation of relations to the United
States, reestablished at the center of the industry, and by more decentralized forms
of provision of state support for high-tech development.
Third, the article argues that the conditions under which new regimes can emerge
are a consequence of the unanticipated global consequences of previous regimes.
In each period, the dominant regime was somewhat unstable as the emergence of
the new actors in the global industry established the conditions of possibility of the
next regime. Global military competition had fueled military developmentalism,
which in turn shaped the dominant U.S. firms. These firms began to develop inter-
national markets and production networks, which then became the basis of bureau-
cratic developmental strategies in East Asia. These strategies in turn helped develop
a new global computer production network, which has now become the basis of
network developmental strategies focused on developing high-tech regions within
these networks. This analysis suggests that we must locate particular forms of state
action in “time and place” and, more specifically, within particular social condi-
tions, political institutions and discourses, and patterns of international hegemony—
the developmental state is likely to emerge in different guises under varying
sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions at different times and places (Ó Riain,
2004).
This article therefore seeks to contribute to our understanding of the changing
geography of computer industry dominance through an analysis of the shifting sys-
tems of innovation within the global industry, bolstered by different forms of state
developmentalism. These national contexts did not usually determine corporate strat-
egies, but provided a context that supported firms’ abilities to pursue their strate-
gies effectively—and different national contexts were particularly successful under
different conditions. While the article cannot fully explore the interactions between
firms and the state, it concentrates on establishing the nature of the key state sup-
ports for business under each regime.
In addition to developing our understanding of how computer industries have
been shaped by social and political institutions, the article also suggests a reorient-
ing of our perspective on the developmental state toward an understanding of the
variety of forms that state developmentalism can take and of the economic, politi-
cal, and world-historical conditions under which particular forms of “the” develop-
mental state emerge and change (for more detailed discussion of this approach see
Ó Riain, 2004). This perspective connects to research on the different “varieties of
80 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2006
capitalism” across time and space (Soskice and Hall, 2001). However, it is mislead-
ing to view these “varieties of capitalism” simply as a matter of national institu-
tional complexes competing in a “world market,” as is often implied in that literature
(Soskice and Hall, 2001; Burawoy, 2001). These institutional complexes are deeply
interdependent and shape each other’s developmental trajectories. Institutional sys-
tems of innovation and state developmentalisms that become dominant shape the
competitive context for new entrants, but can also provide resources if access can
be negotiated to them. Each dominant institutional and social world of computer
production becomes the global context and foundation for subsequent institutional
and social “challengers.” Finally, the approach adopted here also suggests that a
nuanced view of industrial globalization is required where the fates of contending
policy regimes are shaped by the global conditions of the day, but where the suc-
cessful policy regimes shape the context for the emergence of future “challenger”
regimes.
Given the temporal and spatial range of the discussion, the analysis in the rest of
this article draws on secondary literature to provide a macro-level analysis of these
processes of domination and challenge in each of the three periods of the global
computer industry. The analysis briefly explores three aspects of each period: (a)
the key features of the dominant model of state developmentalism; (b) how the
model of state developmentalism contributed to the success of some national com-
puter industries over their closest rivals; and (c) the global computer industry con-
sequences of the dominant policy regime. In the concluding section, the forms of
state developmentalism are compared and the transformation in the position of the
United States—dominant at the beginning and end of this 60-year history—is ana-
lyzed.
A Framework for the Analysis of State Developmentalisms
Developmental states occupy a particularly strategic position in this politics of the
global economy. They are typically central to the most dynamic centers of capital
accumulation, innovation, and employment growth. Economically crucial, they are
also politically pivotal. This article sees capitalism as a powerful structuring force
for states but as a system of production and consumption that is itself politically
embedded. Therefore, widespread as state developmentalism is in the history of
capitalism, it has taken different forms under varying domestic and international
conditions. It becomes analytically and politically critical to understand the spe-
cific form of different developmental state regimes.
Developmental states are still the most likely candidate for boosting an economy
beyond the narrow logic of private investment and thereby improving its position in
the international division of labor. The state cannot achieve these ends in isolation
but depends on its relation to society for its success. In particular, developmental
states are characterized by what Peter Evans calls “embedded autonomy.” Such
states are embedded in local capital through the close social ties between state bu-
reaucrats and domestic business owners and managers. Yet effective developmental
state apparatuses retain their autonomy due to the presence of a classic Weberian
bureaucracy—based on meritocratic recruitment and promotion and norms of ob-
jective, procedural rationality. While embeddedness allows the state to gather infor-
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mation and mobilize resources, autonomy (safeguarded by bureaucracy) and ac-
countability of state agencies guarantees that national development goals remain
central to state action (Evans, 1995).
These states avoid the potentially disastrous predatory relationship between the
state and the market or society (Evans, 1995). In such cases, individuals and agen-
cies within the state treat their state power as a resource to be used to plunder re-
sources generated by the market or within society. However, developmental states
are typically exclusionary—while an educated labor force organized for learning is
critical, labor is typically excluded from the key institutions of the developmental
state (Amsden, 1989, Deyo, 1992).
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the differences between military, bureau-
cratic, and network state developmentalisms along critical dimensions (see Ó Riain,
2004 for a more detailed discussion of bureaucratic and network forms). First, strat-
egies vary across forms of developmentalism, although each form involves an un-
derwriting of private sector development by significant state intervention. Military
developmentalism concentrates on developing an industry (in competition with other
investment possibilities) by putting in place the key features of any industry—la-
bor, markets, investment capital, and so on. Bureaucratic regimes manage depen-
dency while intervening to create new domestic capabilities to be brought to bear in
global markets, while network developmentalisms mediate local and global con-
nections and play a key role in fostering “better” connections to the global.
Second, these various strategies imply quite different social and institutional foun-
dations. Military developmentalist regimes are able to create their own “greenfield”
ties in new industries, but these are heavily shaped by existing networks of defense
Table 1
Forms of State Developmentalism
Military Developmentalism Bureaucratic
Developmentalism Network Developmentalism
Collective Building Industry by Building National Building Global
Development Underwriting Key Champions by Regions by Mediating
Strategies Features of Industrial Managing Dependency Global Connections
Organization • Strategic Use of • Building Local
• Provision of markets Protectionism Networks around
• Creation of related • Industrial Subsidies Global Capital
professions • Domestic Banking • Taking Local
• Funding research System Innovation Networks
Global
Institutions
Embeddedness Embedded in Military Embedded in Domestic Multiply Embedded in
Industrial Complex; Big Capital Capital Fractions of
Science and Domestic Domestic and
International Capital
Autonomy Military Secrecy and Coherence of State Valorization of Industrial
National Security Bureaucracy Development Agencies
Accountability High Quality Criteria Bureaucratic Rules and External Evaluations of
Performance Measures Benchmarks
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contracting (Markusen et al., 1986). Bureaucratic developmentalist regimes are
characterized by close ties between key state bureaucrats, domestic entrepreneurs,
and executives, but network regimes are embedded and multiply in local and for-
eign capital and local, particularly professional, networks of innovation (Ó Riain,
2004). To avoid capture and clientelism, developmental state agencies must retain
some autonomy. The high autonomy typically afforded the military is checked by
the high quality standards of much military production, which act as a performance
pressure. In bureaucratic regimes, autonomy is secured through a tightly coupled,
cohesive Weberian bureaucracy that also provides a degree of accountability through
explicit rule based regimes (Evans, 1995). Network regimes may be no less bureau-
cratic but their multiple embeddednesses are monitored through a loosely coupled
state structure subject to external evaluations.
We should not reify these forms of state developmentalism. Although they may
appear unyielding in their prime, history suggests that such regimes are only tem-
porarily stable—ultimately failing to walk the tightrope of embedded autonomy
and either being captured or becoming overly autonomous and isolated, or creating
the conditions through their developmental successes for new actors to emerge on
the global stage to challenge them.
Bullets, Bytes, and Bureaucrats: Military Developmentalism and the Rise of
the U.S. Computer Industry
Technological advances and state militarization became intimately linked with the
“industrialization of war” from the 1840s onward (McNeil, 1982; Arrighi, 1999).
World War II led to what some call the first modern computer, developed through
the work of Alan Turing in British code-breaking activities. The war played a criti-
cal role in the development of the computer industry as “the degree to which scien-
tists and engineers were mobilized in support of the Allied war effort and the scale
of their activities were unprecedented” (Flamm, 1987: 6). World War II enabled a
massive state-sponsored mobilization of economic and social resources in support
of technological development, an effort that was highly coordinated by a variety of
state bureaucracies across the warring nations.
After the war, the support for high-tech research continued—particularly in the
United States, which had emerged from the war with its own industrial infrastruc-
ture intact and a clear position as the hegemonic power in conflict with the emerg-
ing Soviet Union. U.S. government support for the emergence of a computer industry
was massive, with the government accounting for the bulk of research and develop-
ment (R&D) funding and being the primary market during the critical years when
the industry was developing after World War II. Defense remained central to the
U.S. system of “military developmentalism.”
Military Developmentalism in the United States
In the years after World War II, U.S. computer firms came to dominate this new
industry, in the process developing the industry itself. Why were U.S. firms able to
establish such market dominance? This occurred in part because the emerging lead
firms were supported in significant ways by nonmarket institutions. In fact, in the
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early stages of the emergence of key sectors such as computers and software, the
U.S. federal government was itself a significant market. In the early 1950s, govern-
ment procurement accounted for 54 percent of the computer market, dropping to 21
percent by 1959 and 10 percent by 1966—all figures that would be much higher if
we took into account the indirect effect of demand from military contractors (Flamm,
1987: 107). Government again played a key role in the later emergence of newer
sectors such as software: “as late as the early 1980s, some thirty years after the
beginning of software production [and more than ten after the creation of an inde-
pendent software industry], military demand may have accounted for 50 per cent of
total software industry revenues” (Langlois and Mowery, 1994: 68). Military high-
technology development made a critical contribution to the development of the
Internet, built originally around the Defense Department’s ARPAnet (Newman,
2002).
Research and development for the production of these new technologies was
also heavily government funded. Before World War II, less than 20 percent of U.S.
computing R&D funds came from the government. During World War II this jumped
to 83 percent, dropped to 54 percent by 1957 and rose again to 64 percent in 1961
(Flamm, 1987). The bulk of this government support was through the military and
by far the greater part of that spending was outside the state itself, going as con-
tracts to university and industrial labs. Although federal funding declined between
1965 and 1975 in the face of competition for funding from the Vietnam War and the
“moon race,” in the 1970s, federal funds accounted for at least 75 percent of math
and computer science research in universities (Flamm, 1987; Langlois and Mowery,
1994; Markusen et al., 1986).
In particular, the state played a critical role in the United States in developing the
technical communities surrounding high-tech industries such as computers, semi-
conductors, and software (see Breznitz, 2005 for an interesting perspective on how
the military operated as a kind of public space in Israeli high technology). The
channeling of funding through the universities only strengthened the position of
U.S. universities as leading research institutions worldwide that could attract re-
searchers from all over the world. This is clearest in the case of software, where a
new discipline of computer science was created with state sponsorship, rather than
semiconductors and aerospace, which built on existing scientific disciplines and
academic infrastructures. The SAGE project gave a massive boost to the software
programmer labor force, employing 400 programmers in 1959, where approximately
200 in the whole country had the requisite skills only four years before (Flamm,
1987: 122; Langlois and Mowery, 1996: 59). The National Science Foundation and
ARPA at the Department of Defense helped significantly in building computer sci-
ence as a discipline in the 1960s, so that with “virtually no formal programs in
Computer Science in U.S. universities in 1959, by 1965 there are 15 offering doc-
torates in Computer Science and 17 offering Bachelor’s degrees” (Langlois and
Mowery, 1994: 62). The bulk of this expansion was funded through government
funding.
The leading high-tech firms and regions within the United States have been well
supported by this model of military developmentalism. Government procurement
accounted for about one-sixth of IBM’s sales in the late 1950s (Flamm, 1987: 108).
Furthermore, government funds paid for 35 percent of research at IBM in 1963, a
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year when IBM was putting together an enormous push to develop the commercial
System 360 (Flamm, 1987: 95), which transformed the face of computing. Funds
did decline significantly after this, but only once U.S. technological dominance had
been established. The military and its link to the universities were also crucial to the
development of Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994: Chapter 2; Leslie, 2000). This reaches
all the way back to the “earliest days of experimentation in the fields of radio,
television and military electronics” (Sturgeon, 2000a). Silicon Valley remains the
largest recipient of military contracts in the United States (Gray et al., 1999: 295)
and military research funds have supported crucial fundamental research in the late
1950s at Fairchild Semiconductor on the integrated circuit, in the 1960s at Stanford
Research Institute on communications technologies, and in the 1970s at Xerox PARC
on personal computers (Newman, 1998: Chapter 3).
The contribution of the military to the computer industry in the United States
was marked by the combination of a massive, centralized military side of the state
with an economic ideology that theoretically favored the “free market.” The result
was a form of military developmentalism with a dominant role for government in
both funding development and purchasing the products of that development, but
where technology development itself remained largely in private firms that held the
proprietary rights to the technology. Strategic decisions regarding technology itself
remained largely in the hands of the lead firms and efforts by government to direct
technology development itself often failed. While the firms involved in this “early
period” of the industry were market actors, they were also embedded in a set of
markets, financing, and scientific communities that were heavily supported by public
institutions.
U.S. Dominance over Europe
All these factors point to some of the reasons why the United States outstripped the
leading European economies in high-technology industries. Although the military
provided the initial impetus for much of European participation in high technology,
the scale of the resources committed to military spending generally and technology
specifically was in no way comparable to the resources expended within the U.S.
Hendry (1990) estimates that U.S. monetary support for the computer industry was
about 35 times greater than in the United Kingdom—the country that was closest to
the United States in terms of technological prowess in 1950. The weakness of the
state commitment to taking a leading role in developing the technology industry is
indicated by the pressures placed upon the British National Research Development
Corporation, the agency charged with developing the computer industry, to pay its
way within five years—effectively forestalling any substantial “missionary” role
on the part of that agency. In addition to being “less statist” than the United States,
the U.K. high-technology policy regime was also “less market-oriented.” The major
recipients of British defense funding defined themselves as defense industry pro-
ducers, not as commercial computing companies, and the British government did
not fund business-oriented firms (Evans, 1995: 100). The U.S. state not only chan-
neled funds to specific firms but also was also willing to foster a wide range of
market actors and supporting institutions. U.S. funding often went to new firms and
the process of learning within the industry was furthered by high rates of mobility
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among engineers, both between private firms and between universities and industry
(Hendry, 1990: 163). The strategy of building a single national champion—which
in many ways blended the worst features of state and market strategies—backfired
badly in Britain as ICL, once a leading global computer company, was bought by
Fujitsu in 1991.
The French and German computer industries fared better than the British, de-
spite starting from a less promising technological base. While French government
expenditure on computer related R&D ranked similarly to that of the United King-
dom in the 1970s, German spending was more than twice the U.K. and French
levels (Flamm, 1987; Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998: 48). The French state’s efforts to
promote Groupe Bull as the national champion have conspicuously failed, while
the firm that was pushed out of the computer industry (CGE-Thomson) to make
way for Bull has flourished (Loriaux, 1999: 273). However, Thomson itself has
benefited from state upgrading of telecommunications and public procurement.
German efforts to promote a national champion, Siemens, also ran into difficulties
although the German computer industry has done significantly better than the French,
with a much more vibrant sector of independent technology firms alongside the
“national champion.”
It turns out then that the U.S. state was more developmental in its practice than
the European states, which were often more explicitly developmental in their ideol-
ogy (Loriaux, 1999). In the United States, the state, particularly through the military,
mobilized society to participate in the market, while in Europe, the state incorpo-
rated society into itself on a greater scale through the institution of the “national
champion.”
Global Consequences of Military Developmentalism: Expanding Markets and
Foreign Investment
The United States therefore came to rapidly dominate global markets in informa-
tion technology—IBM alone accounted for 37 percent of mainframe computer sales
(the dominant product within the industry) in 1975 (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998:
15). This U.S. dominance became the context within which all subsequent attempts
to enter the industry developed. But if this dominance formed the context for devel-
opment strategies around the world, it simultaneously set the stage for the future
development of the U.S. industry itself. As Richard Gordon argues “Technical domi-
nance and expansive markets subject to minimal foreign competition provided a
high rate of potentially marketable innovations in conjunction with a favorable struc-
ture for economic risk taking and technical experimentation” (2001: 15). The high
profits, which the leading firms and regions such as Silicon Valley enjoyed, were
the basis of continuing rounds of innovation. While government intervention en-
abled the United States to foster the leading industry, it was also made possible by
the U.S. hegemonic position, militarily and within world markets. Kenneth Flamm
(1987: 17) points out how crucial international markets were to U.S. firms in gain-
ing increasing returns from their technology—which could then be plowed back
into R&D to cement further their leading global position.
Many countries pursued a direct connection to the leading high-technology in-
dustries by attempting to lure U.S. companies as direct investors in their rapidly
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spreading export processing zones, industrial parks, and free trade zones, which
combined infrastructure with special regulatory regimes, which also suspended many
of the rights that workers had gained throughout the nation. These efforts attracted
many willing investors: “The first EPZ appeared at Shannon, Ireland, in 1958; In-
dia established the first Third World EPZ in 1965, and by the mid–1980s roughly
1.8 million workers were employed in a total of 173 EPZs around the world”
(McMichael, 1996: 92). Global flows and stocks of foreign direct investment and
the volume of global trade increased much more rapidly than world GDP in the late
1960s and the 1970s, before recession and protectionism in the 1980s reined in this
particular outburst of globalizing activity (Held et al., 1999: 242). In keeping with
this broader trend, in the 1960s, American and Japanese electronics firms began to
move production “offshore,” first to Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore;
then, beginning in the mid–1980s, throughout Southeast Asia (Henderson, 1989).
In expanding their foreign operations from the 1960s onward, Japanese firms were
motivated by an interest in servicing Asian markets, and by the attraction of low-
wage labor that would facilitate their push into the large and lucrative American
market. The strategy of American firms, by contrast, was at first part of a strategy
of the globalization of the computer industry and was later largely a defensive anti-
dote to stiff Japanese competition.
Bureaucratic Developmentalism and the Rise of East Asian Electronics
The East Asian “Tigers” were able to develop dynamic domestic IT industries with
great success in international markets by the 1980s, despite beginning from a weak
technological basis in the 1960s. A brief review of the development experience of
IT in East Asia reveals a set of strategies for development, which incorporated many
of the elements of the EPZs and the “bargaining” strategies outlined above, but
which put them together into very effective strategies for developing indigenous
technological capacity.
Bureaucratic Developmentalism in the Asian Tigers
Japan was the clearly the greatest “success story” in the international computer
industry between the 1960s and the 1980s. Driven forward by an alliance between a
cohesive state bureaucracy (with strong informal internal ties based on school af-
filiations) and the large firms and business groups (keiretsu), a form of “alliance
capitalism” emerged that proved remarkably successful in international competi-
tion (Gerlach, 1992). In the early 1960s, computers were targeted as a strategic
sector for development and a variety of policy measures were put in place. These
measures included extensive protection against foreign competition and some hard-
nosed bargaining with foreign multinationals such as IBM (Dedrick and Kraemer,
1998: 41). Building on a set of economic institutions, which had emerged since the
late nineteenth century (Dore, 1973), the Japanese state stimulated domestic de-
mand for Japanese computers, promoted public and private R&D, and provided a
variety of investment incentives for domestic firms. Japanese policy combined com-
petition and cooperation in a fruitful mix. Weaker firms were allowed to fail in the
face of domestic competition, although protected from foreign competition for long
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periods. “Market competition” was used strategically to promote business develop-
ment, rather than as an overriding ideological principle. At the same time these
competing domestic firms also often engaged in cooperative arrangements—either
through R&D consortia or through connections to the famous Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) or Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT)
(Johnson, 1982; Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998).
Similar examples of developmental states emerged elsewhere in East Asia—
particularly in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Korea pursued a “bureaucratic
developmentalism” that was particularly close to the Japanese model, with close
ties between a centralized state bureaucracy and the chaebol, or large business groups
(Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995). Electronics was targeted as a critical sector from the
early 1970s, and the state provided loans, created cooperative information-sharing
institutions, provided a market through procurement, took on some design work,
and built an information infrastructure that was used to boost industry production
as well as provide infrastructure (Bae, 2000; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990).
Singapore combined a bureaucratic state with an emphasis on attracting foreign
investment rather than fostering the growth of a domestic bourgeoisie. Gregg Huff
(1995) argues that the key feature of Singapore’s model of development was gov-
ernment control over wages and labor, which enabled the attraction of FDI and the
ending of unemployment. This in turn enabled the state to force a high level of
domestic savings and these savings were mobilized, largely through state-run con-
tributory funds, to finance building infrastructure—both for business and also for
the social reproduction of the population (e.g., through housing provision). Low
wages and excellent infrastructure maintained the flow of FDI while the heavy state
subsidies of housing and other costs of social reproduction combined with labor
repression and incorporation to sustain popular support for the regime. The state’s
intense labor control ensured low inflation in a context of tight labor supply. There
have been significant shifts from a reliance on low-cost labor to upgrading opera-
tions in Singapore and sending low-skill work offshore, to attempts to improve
local productivity and innovation so that Singapore is increasingly a center of e-
commerce and engineering as well as assembly (McKendrick, 2000).
Taiwan’s strategy sits somewhere between Korea’s and Singapore’s, combining
foreign and indigenous firms. Whereas information technology foreign investment
figures prominently, transnational technical communities and migration ties have
been just as important. The Taiwanese state in the 1950s was certainly less “hands
on” than the Korean state in directly influencing firm decisions but, although the
state did not “pick winners” among firms, it still shaped the activities of firms:
“Even after most import and foreign exchange controls were lifted, the government
exercised its will through the myriad licenses necessary for a firm to operate; the
requirement of prior approval for foreign loans and technology agreements; public
ownership of the banking system, which held interest rates much higher than in
most Third World countries; vagueness in tax laws such that politically uncoopera-
tive firms could be threatened with audits, and so on” (Amsden, 1985: 98).
Ultimately each of these Asian Tigers participated in the global computer indus-
try in different ways. South Korea and Japan’s connections to the international
economy are funneled through the chaebol and keiretsu, respectively. Taiwan’s
smaller domestic firms are deeply integrated into what is essentially an extension
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of global IT production networks, while Singapore connects to these networks pri-
marily through the subsidiaries of foreign TNCs (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998: 223–
226). Despite their significant differences, each of these East Asian Tiger economies
had a well-established and effective state bureaucracy that exerted a positive effect
on development outcomes, net of investment, education, and “convergence” (Rodrik,
1997; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1999).
Toothless Tigers: Brazil and India
The Asian Tigers were not the only newly industrializing countries to attempt to
build computer industries in the 1960s. Many attempted to emulate the U.S. model
of military developmentalism. Brazil and India illustrate some of the typical fea-
tures of such strategies in countries that had only limited success in the interna-
tional information technology industry. Both began their computer industries through
the leading role of the military in the 1960s. The first computer in Brazil was in-
stalled at the navy in 1958. More important, under the military dictatorship from
1964 to 1985, computers and technological autonomy were seen as economically
and militarily strategic (Evans, 1995; Luzio, 1996). In India, the initiative for build-
ing an indigenous capacity in computer manufacturing came from the nationalist
technocrats in the mid–1960s, but jibed well with military geopolitical concerns,
which had been fueled by a series of military setbacks in the early 1960s and the
U.S. refusal to sell India electronics equipment during the war with Pakistan in
1965 (Evans, 1995: 106). Despite a similar industrial starting point to the Asian
Tigers, Brazil and India were unable to build a computer industry of the same size
or sophistication.
Both countries initially emphasized state-owned enterprises as the vehicle through
which this technological autonomy would be built and sustained. After all, military
technological autonomy required close control over indigenous technology. The
Electronics Corporation of India, Ltd. (ECIL) was formed in 1967, under the aus-
pices of the Atomic Energy Commission, and while it struggled commercially and
particularly in commodity production, it carried out important large-scale systems
integration projects within the Indian economy—projects that the smaller private
sector firms were poorly placed to carry out (Evans, 1995: 131; Grieco, 1984). In
Brazil, a variety of state companies formed Digibras, later to form COBRA making
minicomputers in joint alliance with Ferranti of England, which provided the tech-
nology and a local firm, which carried out production while Digibras contributed
the investment (Luzio, 1996: 4).
India and Brazil therefore both placed great weight on developing “national”
computer industries and attempted to combine the development of state-owned en-
terprises with negotiations with TNCs from behind protectionist barriers into a strat-
egy that could foster the growth of indigenous technological capability. Despite
some successes, they were more unsuccessful by the early 1990s in their attempts
to generate a vibrant domestic computer industry. Their large domestic markets
gave them a resource that could be used in bargaining with TNCs, which was not
available to many other smaller countries (Grieco, 1984), but it could not deliver
the deep indigenous technological capability that they pursued. Their emphasis on
building national champions could not compete with the more thorough
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developmentalism of the Asian Tigers, or with their more effective use of markets
to promote domestic competition and development. In this respect, their weakness
in relation to the Asian Tigers was similar to that in the previous period of the
European countries in relation to the United States.
Global Consequences of Bureaucratic Developmentalism: Globalization and
Revival in the U.S. Computer Industry
State developmentalism was critical in building up the regional economy of East
Asia, from within extensive international connections with Japan and the United
States, but, in the process, it transformed the character of the international com-
puter industry. Most spectacular, the character of global competition was deeply
intensified by the rise of East Asia (Brenner, 2000). But the character of global
production was changed, as well as that of global markets. New capacities in the
region ironically contributed to the revival of U.S. electronics in the 1990s, a revival
that was only in part due to the difficulties of Japanese firms. Japanese firms built
hierarchical international production networks—reflecting their successful domes-
tic production strategies. American firms, by contrast, entered into alliances with
increasingly sophisticated suppliers, which often emerged through the kinds of lo-
cal strategies for upgrading described above.
Many U.S. firms came to rely heavily on the production capabilities and techno-
logical sophistication of suppliers in the China Circle, Singapore and South Ko-
rea—enabling American firms to escape dependence on Japanese suppliers who
were also competitors, and to lower costs and improve turnaround times (Borrus,
1997). However, these new suppliers are also potential competitors, suggesting a
new axis of global competition with a geographical shift from Japan to the China
Circle and an organizational shift from competing hierarchies to competing global
networks (Borrus, 1997). This is all the more critical since “first-tier suppliers” or
“turnkey contract manufacturers” have come to occupy a critical position in global
production networks. These production networks also are increasingly taking on a
“merchant” character so that they can be broken and reassembled easily and quickly
as the lead U.S. firms have reasserted control over the key technology and market-
ing functions (Sturgeon, 1999). U.S. high-tech industry has increasingly and effec-
tively integrated East Asian production networks into its own global operations.
Mowery (2001) argues that there has been a gradual shift from U.S. technologi-
cal hegemony in 1950 to a global multipolar system of not only production but also
innovation, extending first to Europe, then Japan, and now even to a select number
of NICs: “Specific sites become centers for specific technological competences
and attract considerable investments by multinational firms in R&D and often (be-
cause of the need for close links between R&D and other activities) production”
because of “the growing returns to specialization in specific technological activi-
ties or competences, some apparent decline in ‘scope economies’ among specific
competences…and the increased international dispersion of these competences”
(Mowery, 2001: 151). The United States remains at the center of this system, al-
though now much more closely linked to foreign firms through rising foreign in-
vestment in the United States, interfirm alliances and “transnational technical
communities” (Saxenian, 1999). This is facilitated in part, Mowery argues, by the
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U.S. system of innovation, which is probably more open than most due to the im-
portant role of universities in R&D, the market for corporate control, and a liberal
U.S. government policy toward FDI (2001: 153).
Network Developmentalism and the Rise of Global Regions
Taken together, these global developments have seen a new relationship between
TNCs and certain regions so that a new international network of regional industrial
clusters has become the context for a new form of “network developmentalism”
where national states seek to integrate high-tech regions into global production and
innovation networks.
Network Developmentalism in Global Regions
New forms of state developmentalism have emerged in economies such as Israel
and Ireland that seek to combine local and global networks of innovation to pro-
mote computer industry development. High technology in these economies shares
certain common features: each economy has undergone liberalization, to the point
where they are “open” to the global economy; each has pursued foreign investment
through financial incentives and investment in a technical labor force; and each has
seen the emergence of important concentrations of technical skill and innovatory
capacity supported by dense social networks of technical professionals and entre-
preneurs (Arora et al., 2000; Breznitz, 2002; Ó Riain, 2004). Israel has built on an
existing technological base and a foundation of returning migrants from the United
States to create a diverse high-tech sector with niche strengths and a large number
of Israeli firms which are international “technology leaders” (Breznitz, 2002). Ire-
land continues to rely heavily on U.S. high-tech foreign investment but has been
able to build an Irish high-tech sector alongside, and relatively independent of, this
foreign sector (Ó Riain, 2004).
A critical element in “upgrading” these international connections has been the
simultaneous fostering of local, territorialized dynamics of learning, innovation,
and growth. Fragile technical communities emerged around foreign firms in Ire-
land and became the basis for a growing indigenous sector. Israel has seen a broad
diversification of local interfirm and social networks across a variety of high-tech
sectors. In each case, the institutional framework of the region—its associations,
educational institutions, support industries, and state agencies and policies—play
an ongoing role in shaping the high-tech region. The Irish and Israeli states are
more likely to stimulate venture capital investment, create a range of innovation
centers, provide R&D funding, and foster international networks than to try and
directly influence firms’ business decisions (Ó Riain 2000, 2004; Breznitz, 2002).
In Ireland, state agencies acted to support emerging indigenous industry and to
upgrade the national system of innovation in three major ways—defining the char-
acter of industrial strategies, implementing company development through grant
aid, and creating an associational infrastructure for innovation.
Research into software firms in Ireland shows, for example, that those firms that
received the most state grant aid exported more, employed more people, and grew
faster. The bulk of early financing of Irish companies came through state-spon-
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sored investment schemes—it was only after growth was well underway in 1999
that private venture capital flooded into Ireland. In 1997, with the Celtic Tiger al-
ready roaring, more than a third of private equity investment in Ireland came from
state sources, and much of the private investment was stimulated by state incentives
for investors (Ó Riain, 2000, 2004).
Israeli high-tech industry, while coming into its own in the 1990s, has its roots
much earlier in Israel’s history (Breznitz, 2002). As early as the 1940s and 1950s,
science and academic research was highly advanced in Israel, which often occurred
through links to the military and, in the 1960s, the connections of the Jewish
diaspora—particularly in the United States—to Israel combined with heavy de-
fense investment to produce large, defense-oriented technology firms. State sup-
port is extensive for all levels of business development in high technology, and
takes the form of matchmaking, investment, and consultative support (Sokolov and
Verdoner, 1997). As early as the 1960s, the Israeli government provided capital
grants and fostered science parks to build the civilian economy. It was among the
earliest states (if not the first) to give R&D grants to individual firms (Roper and
Frenkel, 1998). The state has also been central to the provision of venture capital,
beginning its efforts in 1985. However, success came only with the Yozma scheme,
operating since 1993, which shares the risk of loss with firms and provides favor-
able terms to successful firms for buying back the Yozma shares (Sokolov and
Verdoner, 1997; Breznitz, 2002). Links to the United States are extensive in all
areas of high-tech industry, and policy ties through interfirm alliances and
transnational technical communities are more critical to Israeli high technology
than foreign investment. Ultimately, the Israeli state no longer picks industrial “win-
ners” or directly influences their decisions, but has constructed a range of institu-
tions that effectively foster innovation and learning, support business development,
and channel firms toward particular kinds of activities (such as R&D) that contrib-
ute to more durable economic success.
Global Regions Challenge Bureaucratic Development
While the Irish and Israeli states are active in promoting high technology, they have
done so in ways that are often quite different from the “developmental states” of
Japan and Korea. These network developmentalisms attempt to nurture localized
post-Fordist networks of production and innovation within global investment flows
by shaping the character of the various local connections to global technology and
business networks. The highly concentrated industrial structure and capacity to
mobilize large sunk investments, which had been strengths of the Japanese and
Korean industrial systems in markets such as memory chip production, were now
liabilities in rapidly changing markets such as PCs and software where network
connections were often as critical as large in-firm investments (Dedrick and Kraemer,
1998). Marie Anchordoguy (2000) argues that Japan’s reliance on state targeting,
centralized business groups, bank-centered financing, weak intellectual property,
and production engineering—so crucial to its success in mechanical engineering,
steel, semiconductors, and computer hardware—were liabilities in the networked
world of software design (we might add personal computers, data communications,
information services).
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Taiwan has had perhaps the greatest success of the Asian Tigers in responding to
the changed global conditions. Export processing zones were put in place after
1965 but, over time, the Taiwanese economy became much less dependent on for-
eign investment as Taiwanese firms were able to upgrade their positions within
international production networks—moving toward OEM, ODM, and even innova-
tion (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001; Hobday, 1995). This upgrading was attained through
an increasingly complex and interlocking set of international and local networks—
including not just FDI but also overseas Chinese who had received university edu-
cation in the United States and had long experience and close social ties to centers
of technological innovation such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001). Yet
these international connections were grounded locally by a growing institutional
thickness within the Taiwanese political economy, particularly around information
technology. A range of powerful institutions were developed to support high-tech-
nology entrepreneurship and innovation—including the centers for technological
research such as Electronics Research & Service Organization (ERSO), the Hsinschu
Science-Based Industrial Park (HSIP), industry-university linkages, and industry
and professional associations (Hsu, 1997; Meaney, 1994). Whereas South Korea
and Japan hardly faded as actors in the global computer industry, Taiwan most
effectively transformed its policy and industrial system to integrate into the new
industrial landscape.
Global Consequences of Network Developmentalism: Globalizing the
Reproduction of U.S. Dominance (and Dependence)
Each of these “national” computer industries is closely integrated with the U.S.
industry. The U.S. high-tech industry itself continues to benefit from its historical
dominance within international high technology. U.S. companies have also been
able to retain control over almost all the technical standards within microprocessors
and software—a control that even the Japanese companies have been unable to
wrest away from them in the face of the very significant network externalities and
increasing returns that build up around standards holders (Dedrick and Kraemer,
1998: 90). The increasing importance of the “cultural content” of traded products
also advantages U.S. companies, given the relative U.S. cultural hegemony world-
wide. It is interesting, for example, that Japan has been able to steal away this
advantage in video games, which are oriented toward action and not language,
and appeal to a widespread set of cross-culturally understood elements of mascu-
linity.
However, the character of U.S. dominance of global high technology has been
transformed through the events outlined above. Where the U.S. computer industry,
underpinned by military developmentalism, had once practically created global
markets and investment, it now sits at the center of a network of complex interna-
tional ties. The first of these sets of ties is the flow of labor. AnnaLee Saxenian
(1999: 10) points out that in 1965 only 47 scientists and engineers immigrated to
the United States from Taiwan but in 1967, two years after the Immigration Act
liberalizing immigration from non-European countries, 1,321 did so. This increase
was further boosted by a 1990 act that almost tripled the annual quota of visas
based on occupational skills. Some 24 percent of the Silicon Valley labor force was
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foreign born in 1990, rising to 29 percent in high-tech industries and 32 percent of
engineers. Two-thirds of these are Asian, with the vast majority from India or China,
especially Taiwan. There also has been a huge increase in the number of Chinese
students receiving doctorates in the United States in the 1990s, while the numbers
from India, Taiwan, and South Korea have remained stable. Non-U.S. labor has
been critical to U.S. high-tech growth and immigration has solved an enormous
problem of labor supply in the industry.
These global ties go beyond labor supply to the entrepreneurial and associational
dynamics of U.S. high technology. Saxenian reports that in 1998 some 24 percent
of Silicon Valley firms had an Indian or Chinese CEO, suggesting a very high (and
probably underestimated) rate of entrepreneurship among these groups (1999: 23).
This has increased over time, with 13 percent of those firms started between 1980
and 1984 having Indian or Chinese CEOs while 29 percent of those started between
1995 and 1998 have (1999: 24). The immigrant entrepreneurs rely heavily on vari-
ous ethnic professional associations in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1999: Chapter 3).
These associations provide valuable mentoring, information, and networks to people
with extensive resources, including large amounts of venture capital. Chinese and
Indian high-tech professionals operate across a complex set of overlapping local
and transnational networks within and across ethnic boundaries. In the process,
they add a valuable dimension to the vibrant regional economies of places such as
Silicon Valley—as the once closed military industrial complex becomes inextrica-
bly linked to transnational capital and labor.
Financing, too, has been heavily shaped by international ties—as the United States
has become a major destination for investment funds, international financial flows
proved crucial to maintaining the investment boom of the 1990s that was so central
to the “dot.com” surge in the computer industry (Silver and Arrighi, 2003). The
character of the U.S. computer industry—and the global regions with which it is
ever more closely tied—is deeply shaped by the financialization of the U.S. economy
in recent decades.
Various states around the world have played a critical role in the U.S. high-tech
success, and its place at the heart of increasingly significant global networks of
finance, production, innovation, and migration has enabled the U.S. economy to
reap the benefits. Nonetheless, this is a much more restricted role for the state in
high technology than in many other economies around the world. Part of the reason
for this is that there is less “need” for a state role within the hegemonic power in the
industry. However, this argument can only take us so far. U.S. leadership was seri-
ously challenged in the 1980s by Japan in particular and the U.S. state did act in
response to that threat, albeit largely through protectionism and pressures on Japan
to “open” their markets. Meanwhile, the basis of U.S. industrial leadership was
increasingly shaky as the most basic requirements of the industry, a steady supply
of educated labor and a “world class” production capacity, were in danger of not
being met within the United States. The number of graduates with computing de-
grees fell steadily from the mid–1980s and U.S. production quality had fallen dra-
matically behind the East Asian economies in the 1980s. In both of these respects,
U.S. high-tech industry has been heavily supported by the actions of states other
than the U.S. state. U.S. industry has been able to avail of extensive government
investments in technical education around the world through the migration of skilled
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labor and degree-level students, while global production networks in East Asia have
enabled the U.S. industry to piggyback upon the state-sponsored advances in pro-
duction within that region.
The U.S. state itself became more active in the global protection of the condi-
tions of market dominance, promoting “Wintelism” (the dominant technological
alliance between Intel and Microsoft) and high-tech intellectual property rights in-
ternationally through the aggressive use of multilateral and, in the meantime, bilat-
eral, trade policy to punish countries with less strict enforcement of international
copyright laws (Hart and Kim, 2001). Kenneth Shadlen et al., (2005) argue that an
extensive and effective international institutional regime has emerged in software
where the United States, WTO, and other related institutions promote the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights in a wide range of countries, with uncertain and
worrying consequences for innovation.
State Developmentalisms in the Global Information Economy
This article argues that we can meaningfully describe the key periods of the history
of the global computer industry in terms of the three major policy regimes that have
supported the dominant firms and regions within the industry. This article also
argues that these policy regimes can be thought of as state developmentalisms, which
take significantly different forms across the history of the industry, and that the
conditions under which new regimes can emerge result from the unanticipated glo-
bal consequences of previous regimes. State developmentalisms have been crucial
to the computer industry, but they have varied significantly across time and place.
While they have been shaped by existing global regimes, they have promoted fur-
ther and different rounds of industry globalization.
Each type of state developmentalism—military, bureaucratic, and network—
shares certain characteristics. Each form placed more emphasis on shaping the con-
ditions under which firms operated, rather than directly influencing business and
technology decisions. In this respect, state developmentalisms veered closer to the
market model than to state production or even detailed planning (although in each
case, some of this was present and important). Yet each form of developmentalism
also went well beyond setting ground rules for market functioning to shape mar-
kets, financing, labor supply, international ties, and even the social structure of
innovation itself. In each era, the “failed”—or at least less successful cases of
developmentalism—were both less statist and less market-oriented than the suc-
cessful cases that created significant supports within which market activity was
embedded.
Nonetheless, each type of state developmentalism has taken a different form
from the others. Military developmentalism used defense spending to create the
basic infrastructure of a new industry—creating the infrastructure for academic
and business R&D and providing many of the early markets into which their prod-
ucts could be sold. However, the companies that were formed as global leaders
were relatively free of state influence and in many cases resisted any form of close
embrace with the state.
The bureaucratic developmentalism of the Asian Tigers tended to hold firms
closer, particularly through the crucial links among government agencies, banks,
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and large firms. There was a much closer relationship between firms and the state—
although firms may have been equally interested in escaping the embrace of the
state as in the United States, the institutional conditions made it much more diffi-
cult for them to do so. Nonetheless, an effective system of supports for sustained
investment and learning by firms and business groups developed and was crucial to
the rise of the Asian Tigers.
The Japanese case illustrates the futility of approaching the issue in terms of
“state versus market.” The Japanese case was both less state-oriented and less mar-
ket-oriented than the U.S. case. The extent of U.S. direct state subsidy was much
greater than in Japan, which tended to operate through dense social networks to
mobilize coalitions of private actors including the financial and industrial power of
the keiretsu. On the other hand, the Japanese state played a much greater role in
shaping the actions of firms within the market.
Finally, network developmentalism has seen the role of the state transformed
again. The state is now more pervasive than ever before—shaping almost any as-
pect of the economic and social environment in the interests of business (Cerny,
1995). But its touch is everywhere lighter when it comes to business itself. The
developmental network state becomes a facilitator and broker as well as its tradi-
tional roles of investor, buyer, and financier.
Finally, the evolution of the global computer industry has apparently taken us
full circle from U.S. dominance after World War II through the East Asian chal-
lenge and back to U.S. dominance. Even leaving the questions of the degree of U.S.
dominance aside, it is clear that the U.S. finds itself in a different position today.
Where in the 1950s the United States constituted the vast majority of the global
computer industry, today’s U.S. firms and policymakers find themselves working
through international networks—of finance, labor, scientific, and technological in-
novation—that are shaped by interacting policy regimes. If international networks
serve to integrate emerging industries into the U.S.-centered industry, they also
pose significant uncertainties and dilemmas of governance for both firms and domi-
nant states. This is all the more telling in an era when the Bush administration’s
agenda is based on harnessing information technology in the service of tightly na-
tionally controlled surveillance structures and force, but when the system of pro-
duction of those technologies is deeply networked internationally.
Each of the most significant transitions in the history of the global information
economy has been driven by a state developmentalism, which has gone beyond the
economic calculus of the day to construct a system of innovation that undertakes
and promotes new activities that are not supported by “the market.” These new
institutional constellations that promote new markets in information technology
are organized on a broader geographical scale, drawing in new territories and ex-
panding markets. But if markets have been expanded internationally, so too have a
dense network of social institutions—interfirm networks, governmental treaties,
transnational technical communities, migration flows, and so on. The contempo-
rary international computer industry is not one of a pure free market but one in
which markets are deeply structured, and even made possible by the historical and
spatial accumulation of multiple forms of technical community, sustained by mul-
tiple forms of state developmentalism interacting across an expanding transnational
“social world of information technology.”
96 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2006
The political foundations of the global computer industry are all the more criti-
cal since the informational techno-economic paradigm is most likely approaching a
period of institutionalization after a period of boom (Perez, 2001). After the bubble
of the 1990s, it seems likely that a period of struggle is now likely to ensue regard-
ing the new modes of regulation and social forms that will become institutionalized
around the computer industry and the broader information economy. The dominant
social organization of the global information economy remains to be determined,
but the struggles over its future relations of production and innovation will depend
greatly upon those social and institutional foundations that we have outlined above.
Note
* Thanks to the two anonymous reviewers who provided extensive and helpful comments.
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